Hezbollah Read online

  46. Barak Ravid, “Hezbollah: UN Envoy Biased in Favor of Israel,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), May 9, 2009.

  47. Statements of Daniel Benjamin and Jeffrey Feltman, Assessing the Strength of Hezbollah.

  48. Roni Sofer, “Mossad Warns Businessman: Hizbullah May Target You,” Ynetnews (Tel Aviv), April 23, 2009.

  49. Amos Harel, “Hezbollah Planning Attack on Israelis in West Africa,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), August 4, 2008.

  50. Itamar Eichner, “Israel Foils 5 Attempted Abduction by Hizbullah,” Ynetnews (Tel Aviv), September 2, 2008.

  51. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Hizballah Network in Africa,” press release, May 27, 2009.

  52. “Colombian Sought in 1994 Argentina Attacks,” CNN.com, May 21, 2009.

  53. Nasrallah, “Resistance and Liberation Day.”

  54. Barak Ravid, “IDF Chief Reported: Hezbollah Was Involved in Attack on Israeli Convoy in Jordan,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), December 8, 2010.

  55. United Press International, “Israelis Brace for Hezbollah’s Revenge,” January 25, 2010.

  56. “Qassem: Hizbullah Still Seeking Revenge for Mughniyeh’s Assassination,” Naharnet (Beirut), February 14, 2010.

  57. Government of New Zealand, “Case to Designate Lebanese Hizbollah’s Military Wing.”

  58. Addis and Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress.

  59. Fadhil Ali, “New Hezbollah Manifesto.”

  60. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Hizballah Financial Network,” press release, December 9, 2010.

  61. US Department of State, Public Notice 2612, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, October 2, 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 195 (Oct. 8, 1997).

  62. “Embassy Row,” Washington Times, December 12, 2001.

  63. Addis and Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress; US Department of the Treasury, “Twin Treasury Actions Take Aim at Hizballah’s Support Network,” press release, July 24, 2007.

  64. “UK Ban on Hezbollah Military Arm,” BBC News, July 2, 2008.

  65. Australian Government, Attorney General’s Office, “Hizballah External Security Organisation,” May 11, 2011.

  66. Government of the Netherlands, Ministry of the Interior, “Annual Report 2004: General Intelligence and Security Service.”

  67. Government of Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” Public Safety Canada website, last modified August 20, 2012.

  68. Israel Ministry of Defense, Terrorist Organization Decrees, www.mod.gov.il/pages/general/teror.asp .

  69. Statement of James Phillips, Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List.

  70. European Parliament, “Texts Adopted at the Sitting of Thursday, 10 March 2005,” March 10, 2005.

  71. US CIA, “Lebanon’s Hizballah,” 9.

  72. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Hizballah for Supporting the Assad Regime,” press release, August 10, 2012.

  73. Author interview with law enforcement officials, March 11, 2010.

  74. Benjamin and Feltman, Assessing the Strength of Hizballah; see also statement of Frank Urbancic Jr., Hezbollah’s Global Reach.

  75. Universal Strategy Group, Directed Study of Lebanese Hezbollah, produced for the United States Special Operations Command, Research and Analysis Division, October 2010, p. 3.

  76. Norton, Hezbollah: Short History, 33.

  77. Government of New Zealand, “Case to Designate Lebanese Hizbollah’s Military Wing.”

  78. Qassem, Hizbullah: Story from Within, 98. Augustus Richard Norton disputes the founding timeline of Hezbollah leadership, but his version of events appears to contradict not only Hezbollah’s own account by those of the CIA as indicated in declassified CIA reports referenced later in this book. According to Norton, “Although its leading members refer to 1982 as the year the group was founded, Hezbollah did not exist as a coherent organization until the mid-1980s. From 1982 through the mid-1980s it was less an organization than a cabal.” See Norton, Hezbollah: Short History, 34.

  79. Sami Hajjar, “Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace?” Strategic Studies Institute, August 2002, 5.

  80. Magnus Ranstrop, “Hezbollah Training Camps in Lebanon,” in The Making of a Terrorist, ed. James Forest, vol. 2: Training (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 252.

  81. US CIA, “Lebanon: Prospects for Fundamentalism.”

  82. Wright, Sacred Rage, 95.

  83. US CIA, “Lebanon: Prospects for Fundamentalism.”

  84. Wege, “Hizballah Security Apparatus.”

  85. Byman, Deadly Connections, 82.

  86. Qassem, Hizbullah: Story from Within, 66.

  87. As cited in the Center for Special Studies, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center special information bulletin, “Hezbollah,” June 2003.

  88. Viola Gienger, “Iran Gives Weapons, $200 Million a Year to Help Lebanese Hezbollah Re-Arm,” Bloomberg, April 20, 2010.

  89. “Iran Cutting Financial Aid to Hezbollah,” Daily Star (Beirut), October 12, 2011.

  90. Rabil, “Has Hezbollah’s Rise Come at Syria’s Expense?” 43–51.

  91. Hassan Fattah, “Hezbollah Declares Full Support for Syria,” New York Times, March 6, 2005.

  92. “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” Jerusalem Quarterly 48 (Fall 1988).

  93. US CIA, “Lebanon: Prospects for Fundamentalism.”

  94. “Backgrounder on Hezbollah,” Council on Foreign Relations.

  95. Government of New Zealand, “Case to Designate Lebanese Hizbollah’s Military Wing”; Rabil, “Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Power Broker.”

  96. Qassem, Hizbullah: Story from Within, 64.

  97. Addis and Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress.

  98. Ibid.; Government of New Zealand, “Case to Designate Lebanese Hizbollah’s Military Wing”; Qassem, Hizbullah: Story from Within, 63–64.

  99. Naim Qassem, interview with al-Mustaqbal, December 31, 2000, as cited in Center for Special Studies, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center special information bulletin, “Hezbollah,” June 2003.

  100. Rabil, “Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Power Broker,” 48–49.

  101. Deeb, “Shia Movement in Lebanon,” 683–98.

  102. Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah.”

  103. Qassem, Hizbullah: Story from Within, 63.

  104. Ibid.

  105. International Crisis Group, “Hezbollah: Rebel without a Cause?” Middle East Briefing, July 30, 2003, 3; Rabil, “Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Power Broker,” 4–8; Ranstorp, “Hezbollah Training Camps in Lebanon,” 251.

  106. Rabil, “Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Power Broker” 4–8.

  107. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Hizballah Leadership,” press release, September 13, 2012.

  108. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Hizballah Leadership,” press release, September 13, 2012; Rabil, “Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Power Broker,” 6.

  109. International Crisis Group, “Hezbollah: Rebel without a Cause?” 3.

  110. Qassem, Hizbullah: Story from Within, 69–70.

  111. Government of New Zealand, “Case to Designate Lebanese Hizbollah’s Military Wing.”

  112. Ibid.

  113. Government of Canada,“Currently Listed Entities,” Public Safety Canada, reviewed December 22, 2010; author interview with Canadian officials, Ottawa, January 12, 2010.

  114. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” July 2007.

  115. Tenet, National Security Threats to the United States.

  116. United Kingdom, Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2005–2006, Cm 6864 (June 2006) 5.

  117. The Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project, “Family of Slain Hizbullah Terror Mastermind ‘Imad Mughniyah, Encourages His Grandson to Follow in His Footsteps,” originally aired on al-Manar TV (Lebanon), February 16, 2012.

&
nbsp; 118. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Hizballah Leadership.”

  2

  Branching Out

  Targeting Westerners in Lebanon and Beyond

  BEIRUT, A CITY BATTERED BY WAR, was experiencing a period of relative calm in fall 1983. US diplomats and soldiers were still coming to terms with the suicide bombing that struck the US embassy in April, and US Marines wore their combat uniforms everywhere they went—even to social events and diplomatic functions. But to the US Marine commander on site, the threat environment seemed to have eased somewhat. The embassy bombing was seen as an outlier event. Marines were free to roam the city and were interacting with Lebanese children in public without fear of ambush.1 Beirut was under a cease-fire, and hopes were high for Syrian reconciliation talks. It was the quiet before the storm.

  In the early hours of October 23, 1983, a young Lebanese man from a Shi’a family awoke, said his morning prayers, and drank tea. In a suburb overlooking the marine barracks, his superiors shared a few final thoughts with him, after which a senior cleric blessed him before he drove off in a yellow Mercedes truck.2 At 6:22 AM, he rammed the explosive-laden truck through the guard post at the entrance to the US Marine Battalion Headquarters Building in Beirut. The blast decimated the four-story, concrete, steel-reinforced structure—considered one of the strongest buildings in Lebanon at the time. A dense, gray ash cloud engulfed the area as emergency vehicles rushed to the scene.3 Those soldiers lucky enough to escape serious injury quickly mobilized to rescue their fellow marines, sifting through “dust-covered body parts, moaning wounded and dazed survivors.”4 Seconds later, a nearly identical attack targeted the French Multinational Force (MNF) building less than four miles away.

  Lebanon’s devastating civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, hardened divisions among the country’s various sectarian communities. Against this backdrop, the 1982 Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon created the space in which Iranian diplomats and agents could help fashion the unified entity Hezbollah from a motley crew of Shi’a militias and groups. Another turning point in the 1980s involved militants targeting not only fellow Lebanese but also the international forces dispatched as peacekeepers to provide the war-torn country with a measure of security. Over time, Hezbollah and Iran’s interests in driving foreign forces out of Lebanon would expand from attacks targeting Western interests in Lebanon to attacks on Western interests abroad.

  Over a nine-month period in 1985, the CIA calculated, Iran’s Lebanese proxy groups were responsible for at least twenty-four international terrorist incidents.5 Such targets were popular given Iran’s efforts to dissuade countries from arming and supporting Iraq in its ongoing, costly war against the Islamic Republic. Heeding Iran’s call to carry out attacks beyond Lebanon’s borders, Hezbollah would engage in plots throughout the Middle East. By February 1985 the CIA would warn that “Iranian-sponsored terrorism” presented the greatest threat to US personnel and facilities in the region.6 Inevitably some of the Hezbollah operatives sent to conduct attacks in places like Kuwait were caught, leading Hezbollah to plot bombings, hijackings, and other operations in places as diverse as Germany and the Republic of the Congo in an effort to secure the release of jailed comrades.

  In Lebanon three spectacular attacks targeting US interests over an eighteen-month period defined the group’s relationship with the United States for years to come. The US embassy was bombed on April 18, 1983, killing sixty-three, including seventeen Americans. The driver of the explosive-filled van entered the embassy compound, slowed to navigate a sharp left turn down a cobblestone lane, and then accelerated and crashed into the embassy’s front wall. The seven-floor embassy complex was engulfed in clouds of black smoke that hid the bodies of Lebanese security guards and American government workers torn apart by the blast. Among the dead were the top American intelligence officials stationed in Lebanon, including the CIA’s chief Middle East analyst, Robert C. Ames.7

  Then came the nearly simultaneous attacks of October 23, 1983, targeting the US Marines and French army barracks, both compounds under the aegis of the Beirut-based Multinational Force sent to Lebanon as peacekeepers to oversee the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut.8 Those attacks left 241 Americans and 58 French dead. Less than a year later, on September 20, 1984, the US embassy annex was bombed, killing 24.

  The US government had little doubt about who was behind the 1984 attack, even before crime-scene analysis and sensitive source reporting began to flow in. Writing just days after the second embassy bombing, the CIA noted that “an overwhelming body of circumstantial evidence points to the Hizb Allah, operating with Iranian support under the cover name of Islamic Jihad.” For one thing, the suicide vehicle-bomb employed had become a trademark of the group. And, the CIA added at the time, “Shia fundamentalists are the only organized terrorists in Lebanon likely to willingly sacrifice their lives in such an attack.” Following the bombing, two callers claimed responsibility in the name of Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). Several times in the year to follow, the CIA noted, anonymous callers in Beirut warned that the IJO planned to continue attacking US interests.9

  FBI forensic investigators determined that the marine barracks bombing was not only the deadliest terrorist attack then to have targeted Americans, it was also the single-largest non-nuclear explosion on earth since World War II.10 Composed of at least 18,000 pounds of explosives—the equivalent of six tons of dynamite—the bomb demolished the four-story building on the fringe of the Beirut Airport campus, leaving behind a crater at least thirteen feet deep and thirty feet wide.11 So many marines, sailors, and soldiers perished that day that the base ran out of body bags.12 At the French MNF building, the deaths of fifty-eight French paratroopers marked the French military’s highest death toll since the Algerian war ended in 1962.13 The eight-story building where the paratroopers were staying was literally upended by the blast.

  Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah operational leader and terrorist mastermind, and his brother-in-law and cousin, Mustapha Badreddine, reportedly not only watched the marine barracks bombing through binoculars from a perch atop a nearby building overlooking their neighborhood but also coordinated it.14 In February 1998, Lebanon’s highest court announced plans to try Hezbollah’s first secretary-general, Subhi al-Tufayli, for his role in the marine barracks bombing, among other crimes. At the time, the CIA assessed that Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah would likely help Tufayli escape so he could not “implicate them in a variety of illegal activities, including terrorist operations against US citizens.” He was never tried.15 Another suspect was Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, a leader of the Lebanese Shi’a community often described as one of Hezbollah’s founding spiritual figures.16

  Lebanon’s Khomeini?

  In 1986, the CIA reported that Fadlallah “has long been recognized as the spiritual leader of and political spokesman for Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah.” Fadlallah’s stature, the CIA added, grew “along with Hizballah’s political and military influence.” Fadlallah “benefited from and contributed to the growing extremism in the Shia community by his bold sermons attacking Israel and, later, the presence of the Multinational Force in Lebanon.” Lebanese Shi’a were inspired by the Iranian revolution to seek an Islamic state in Lebanon, and Fadlallah valued his ties to Iran, in large part because of the significant military, financial, and political assistance Tehran provided to Hezbollah. This assistance helped forge a powerful and potent militant Shi’a group out of several smaller groups.17

  But over time Fadlallah’s relationship with Iran changed. Fadlallah never fully embraced the Iranian revolutionary concept of velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent), which, according to a 1986 US intelligence report, “virtually equates Khomeini with the Mahdi—the 12th Imam who is in occultation.”18 As much as Fadlallah sought an Islamic state in Lebanon, US intelligence analysts concluded he also recognized the need to maintain the country’s religious diversity within
an Islamic context. But other, more radical voices within Hezbollah, like the up-and-coming security official Hassan Nasrallah, the CIA warned, promoted a maximalist program in which an Islamic republic in Lebanon would presage a pan-Islamic movement spanning the entire Muslim world. “In our view,” the analysts wrote in 1988, “Nasrallah does not represent the mainstream of the movement.”19 Four years later Nasrallah would rise to the leadership of Hezbollah, moving the group’s mainstream sharply to the right.

  Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah was born in Najaf, Iraq, in 1935, but his father was a Shi’a cleric from Lebanon. Educated by some of the day’s elite Shi’a scholars, he was ordained a Shi’a clerical jurisprudent by Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Khoi. In the 1960s he relocated to his ancestral village in Lebanon, where he amassed a large following by ministering to the needs of local Shi’a. He moved to East Beirut in 1966, where he founded a religious center and charity that would serve as the model for future grassroots efforts focusing on religious and charitable institutions. In 1976, when the Nabaa quarter of East Beirut fell to the Christian Phalangist militia, Fadlallah briefly moved to southern Lebanon only to return to the Shi’a slums in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Living in the Bir al-Abid quarter, Fadlallah served as the local representative of his Iraqi teacher, Ayatollah Khoi, and founded schools, mosques, and other institutions.20

  Though he studied in Najaf under Ayatollah Khoi, a major figure in the quietest tradition of Shi’a Islam, Fadlallah was radicalized by his experience in Lebanon. Between the discrimination suffered by Lebanese Shi’a and the hardships of the civil war, Fadlallah increasingly saw the Muslim world, and Shi’a in particular, as a victim of oppression and injustice at the hands of imperialism and Zionism. “The rise of Imam Musa Sadr in the Shia community [in Lebanon] coincided with Fadlallah’s gradual conversion to the more activist school,” the CIA reported. Sadr preached an explicitly activist message even before the 1979 Iranian revolution, but for Fadlallah the turn away from Ayatollah Khoi’s teaching—and Khoi’s rejection of clerical involvement in politics—came with the revolution in Tehran and his announcement that Ayatollah Khomeini was the “source of authority.”21