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  About a month after the kidnappings, Robberson heard that Amal had rescued the two captives from Hezbollah. The kidnappers were caught by surprise peeling potatoes for their next meal, and the captives were found chained to a wall. Robberson smelled a story—Westerners held by one extremist Shi’a group and rescued by another—and began interviewing people in the Beirut southern suburb where Regier and Joubert had been held. What he found astounded him: The Amal raid on the Hezbollah safe house was directed by an American who instructed the Amal militiamen how to surround the house and led the operation. Robberson probed his Amal and US embassy contacts, seeking more information about this American Amal militia commander. By the time he got back to his office, the death threats had already arrived, prompting his publisher to press him to stop asking questions about the raid. “I dropped it for a while,” Robberson later recalled; “the warning was I’d get myself killed, not just in trouble. But people kept giving me small pieces of information.”11

  It took the journalist some time to identify the American as Isa Abdullah Ali. According to information the US embassy provided him, the American was David Belfield (Dawud Salahuddin), the man wanted for the Bethesda assassination of Ali Akbar Tabatabai. That assessment proved to be wrong, as Robberson found out firsthand not long after he left the Daily Star for Reuters’s Beirut bureau. Shortly after the Beirut embassy bombing, Reuters asked Robberson to travel to the Bekaa Valley, where a fellow Reuters journalist, the Briton Jonathan Wright, had just been kidnapped, to pass out fliers seeking his release. (Wright escaped from his captors after a couple of weeks.)12 Driving back to Beirut through the Shuf Mountains and Beirut’s southern suburbs at nightfall, Robberson and his Lebanese driver came to a checkpoint unlike the many others they had encountered before. Usually Robberson would joke with the Amal militants manning the checkpoints, but this person was eerily serious. “There was no joking with this guy,” Robberson recalled. “After we were waved through, my driver, clearly nervous, says, ‘Do you know who that was? It was the American, Isa.’”13

  This chance meeting rekindled Robberson’s interest in Abdullah Ali. With his editor’s blessing and admonition to be careful, Robberson resumed his investigation. He talked with two Amal officials, and while neither would speak about Abdullah Ali, they both warned him to stay away from the story. Still, “the story seemed too sensational to set aside,” Robberson later wrote.14

  A month later—just days after the US embassy in Beirut was bombed a second time within eleven months—Robberson was riding his motorcycle home from work through West Beirut shortly after midnight when a car full of gunmen tried to ram into him. “Terrified, I tried every possible Steve McQueen maneuver,” he recalled, “but I couldn’t shake them. When I suddenly slammed on the brakes, hoping to evade them, they pulled up right beside me, guns drawn.” One gunman drove off on Robberson’s motorcycle, while another shoved an AK-47 in his back and forced him into the car.15

  A few minutes later, the car pulled up at an Amal checkpoint, where militiamen asked the driver why he had a frightened American in the back of his car. “We are Hezbollah,” the driver responded. The car was waved through the checkpoint. “I remember thinking that their claiming to be Hezbollah was itself almost a threat,” Robberson later reflected. A few minutes later, Robberson’s captors stopped at a field and told him to walk to a wall at one end. “I was convinced he was going to shoot me, firing-squad style.” But he didn’t. His kidnappers drove away, leaving him there. About a week later someone delivered his wallet to the Reuters office, as if to make clear the kidnapping was no random motorcycle robbery.16

  In 1989, Robberson tracked down Isa Abdullah Ali, not in Beirut but in Washington, D.C. In 1986, Abdullah Ali returned to Washington, D.C., after being targeted by a would-be assassin on a busy Beirut street. In the nation’s capital he worked as a groundskeeper at Howard University and as a security guard at a bar.17

  In a series of interviews in Robberson’s living room, Abdullah Ali first denied any knowledge of the journalist’s kidnapping, but one day toward the end of a long session, Robberson turned off his tape recorder and Abdullah stood up. “I have something to tell you,” he said. “I knew about your kidnapping all along. I told them to do it.” He dropped his head, apologized, and asked Robberson, “Are you mad at me?”18

  Abdullah Ali recalled to Robberson that Hezbollah had contacted him to say the organization had heard Robberson was asking questions about him. In a sign of Abdullah Ali’s relative importance to the group, they asked him what he wanted them to do about it.19 It is not clear if Abdullah Ali was already serving as Fadlallah’s bodyguard at this point, though such a role might explain Hezbollah’s particular interest in his safety. He told the Hezbollah muscle to scare Robberson, which they did.

  In summer 1995, Abdullah Ali left Washington, D.C., to fight in Bosnia. Years later, his Bosnian wife would recall that she and others were given training in “military stuff” by “some people from Iran.”20 In fact, Hezbollah operatives were also involved in training Bosnian fighters, according to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Appearing on an Arabic-language television news program (a copy of which was found in the home of a Hezbollah operative in North Carolina several years later), Nasrallah was asked if any Hezbollah fighters had defended Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. “A group went in the past,” Nasrallah replied, “and had a martyr among them. Their main role was training and not participation.”21

  In February 1996, Secretary of Defense William Perry publicly pegged Abdullah Ali (Holt) as “a known American terrorist.”22 Perry told CNN that Holt “has been identified with terrorist groups in the past” and was wanted for questioning in the United States. “Therefore, we take his possible presence in [Bosnia] very seriously. We have alerted troops to look out specifically for him.” The fear, a Pentagon spokesman added, was that Abdullah Ali, who “is viewed as a terrorist threat,” could infiltrate an American base in Bosnia.23

  In fact, Abdullah Ali settled down in Bosnia, where he still lives today with his wife and children. He reportedly travels back to the United States periodically, without incident, and after turning himself in to US authorities, was immediately released for reasons unknown.24 Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Robberson returned to Lebanon and interviewed a Hezbollah leader, who was impressed by his acquaintance with Abdullah Ali, but when told the story of Robberson’s abduction, insisted it was not Hezbollah who kidnapped him. Robberson was not convinced.25

  Bassam Makki’s Return

  In 1989, around when Robberson tracked down Isa Abdullah Ali in Washington, D.C., Bassam Makki was caught plotting to bomb Israeli targets in Germany. After serving time in a German jail, he was deported to Syria in 1990. Members of Makki’s family remained active Hezbollah operatives, including some who resided in New York City. By 1994, the FBI would report that New York Hezbollah cell members were taking directives from the group’s Beirut leadership, exhibiting security-conscious behaviors, and, at the instruction of Hezbollah leaders, increasing counterintelligence efforts aimed at identifying Lebanese nationals within the community who may be providing information to law enforcement.26

  The FBI warned of an unstated number of actual Hezbollah members with “paramilitary training, including explosives and firearms training.” According to the FBI, members “initiated a ‘neighborhood watch program’ in order to alert cell members of an FBI presence.” In another case, a Hezbollah cell in New York was instructed to divide into teams as a security precaution. “Teams were not to discuss Hezbollah matters outside of their team,” the FBI reported. “Secret communications could no longer be carried by courier, and letters could not contain details such as the names of members.” The FBI’s bottom line was sobering: While Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon would be “reluctant to jeopardize the relatively safe environment its members enjoy in the United States by committing a terrorist act within the U.S. borders,” in the event it decided to do so “Hezbollah has the infrastructure present
to support or carry out a terrorist act.”27 As for Bassam Makki, he next resurfaced on the radar of counterterrorism officials in 1998, first in Paraguay.

  Bassam’s younger brother Mohammad Gharib Makki had become a US citizen and, together with his cousin Hassan Gharib Makki, lived in New York. Authorities arrested Mohammad on February 22, 1995, and charged him with mail and wire fraud violations. Targeting Mohammad’s clothing business, Nadia Fashions, prosecutors accused him of engaging in insurance and credit card fraud, among other criminal activities, which served as fundraising schemes to benefit Hezbollah. By one account, Mohammad was the leader of a Hezbollah “New York cell” and a senior Hezbollah lieutenant who reported directly to Hassan Nasrallah.28 Mohammad was released on $100,000 bail. Though his US passport was confiscated, Mohammad fled the country traveling on his Lebanese passport and remains a fugitive today.29 Officials also describe Bassam and Mohammad Makki’s cousin Hassan as a senior Hezbollah member. He, too, is believed to reside in Lebanon, having fled the United States after Mohammad’s arrest.30 Just a few months after Mohammad Makki’s arrest, in October 1995, the seriousness of the Hezbollah threat in the United States was again brought to light through intelligence indicating that the organization “had dispatched a hit squad to assassinate National Security Advisor Tony Lake.” Lake was temporarily moved into a safe house until the threat was run aground.31

  Three years passed before FBI agents working out of the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) received word that Mohammad Makki had attempted to secure a US tourist visa for his American passport in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. He was detained on September 18, 1998, by the Paraguayan National Police, who contacted their American counterparts. When American investigators arrived, they discovered that the man who presented Mohammad Makki’s US passport in Paraguay, which had been issued in Damascus as a replacement, was not Mohammad. A fingerprint check indicated that the person using Mohammad Makki’s passport was actually his cousin Hassan. He was arrested and flown back to the United States to stand trial in Washington, D.C., on charges of misusing a US passport. Matters then took yet another strange turn. At the bond hearing, prosecutors announced that further investigation revealed that the individual in custody was, in fact, neither Mohammad Makki nor his cousin Hassan Makki. It was Bassam Makki, who was back on assignment after his failed bombing attempt in Germany nine years earlier.32

  During his trial Bassam claimed that he owned an internet service provider (ISP), “Internet Center,” and that he worked with the “Computer Center” from 1992 to 1996. But investigators found no evidence for the purported business in Beirut. They checked with officials at the largest ISP in Lebanon, who confirmed that they had never heard of the defendant.33 However, at his trial, defense lawyers presented advertisements in Lebanese newspapers for the purported business, as well as statements by co-owners affirming Bassam’s position within the organization. According to a US embassy source, a business called Internet Center was located in a part of Beirut under Hezbollah control.34 Any claim that Bassam Makki was simply looking to import computers to South America fell apart, though, as the investigation proceeded.

  Investigators quickly learned that Bassam had used his brother’s passport to travel from Lebanon to Asunción, Paraguay, on September 14, 1998, aboard an Air France flight. He was met by Hussein Ali Hmaied, a Lebanese resident of Ciudad del Este and an allegedly central Hezbollah figure in the tri-border area.35 According to FBI special agent Hector Rodriguez, Makki “was accompanied by a key Hezbollah facilitator throughout his trip there.”36 Upon arrival, the two immediately went to the Brazilian consulate to apply for a tourist visa to Brazil. Suspicious Brazilian officials notified the US embassy, which then contacted the FBI.37

  State Department Diplomatic Security agent Michael J. Hudspeth found that despite Makki’s protestations to the contrary, his travel to South America was not related to opening an import-export business. In his affidavit to the court, Hudspeth declared that “whatever Bassam’s activities were in Paraguay, Bassam was sent to Paraguay at the express direction of [Hezbollah secretary-general] Nasrallah and was executing specific functions of the Hezbollah.”38 According to a Lebanese Shi’a confidential informant, the FBI informed, “Makki was involved in the military arm of Hezbollah, primarily in the physical training of Hezbollah terrorists.” While the specific purpose of Makki’s presence in the tri-border area was unknown, the various figures he met with suggest the reasons behind his trip.39

  On arrival in Paraguay, Makki was chaperoned by Hussein Ali Hmaied, who served as the liaison between the Abdallah and Barakat clans. Hmaied owned an office and warehouse at the Galeria Page shopping center, which was designated by the US Treasury Department as a Hezbollah front in December 2006. An informant identified Hmaied as a “trusted assistant” of Abdallah, the owner of Galeria Page, as well as a business partner of Hussein Ali Barakat, Assad Ahmad Barakat’s right-hand man. These ties allowed Hmaied to operate as a bridge between the two factions. Hmaied himself admitted to accompanying Makki in a written statement to the Fifth Duty Magistrate in Ciudad del Este, though he denied having any connection to Hezbollah or knowing Makki well.40

  During his brief time in the tri-border area, Makki reportedly met with several local Hezbollah leaders. Almost immediately after his arrival in Ciudad del Este, Makki met with Hussein Alawieh, a senior Hezbollah member who owned Fatima Import Export and Alawieh Import Export, as well as another business in Canada. The informant described Alawieh as the “primary connection and the most important family member with ties to the Hezbollah in Canada.” Also, according to the informant, Alawieh had told his colleagues that a relative on his mother’s side with the last name Makki had come from Lebanon to invest almost $2 million in the area.41

  Agent Rodriguez’s informant also personally witnessed Makki meeting with Ali Moussa Barakat—the father of Hussein Ali Barakat, Hmaied’s business partner—at the Galeria Page shopping center, next to Hmaied’s office. The informant stated that the elder Barakat was an arms trafficker who came to Paraguay in the 1970s because of “personal problems he had encountered in Lebanon.” Later, he spent significant sums to “fix” those problems and lived in West Beirut.42

  To some, Makki’s travel to South America was specifically intended to mend ties between the region’s two main Hezbollah factions. Getting them to put aside their rivalry was seen as critical to focusing on their shared commitment to support Hezbollah financially and, at times, operationally. Furthermore, some suspect Makki’s meeting with Hussein Alawieh—fingered as a primary link between Hezbollah supporters in the tri-border area and those in Canada—may have focused on efforts to help Makki travel to Canada or to the United States through Canada.43

  As often occurs with Hezbollah operatives, officials were ultimately unable to collect sufficient evidence for use in public court pointing to Makki’s terrorist activities. On December 16, 1998, Makki pleaded guilty in Washington, D.C., federal district court to passport violations and served a few months in prison. In December 1999, he was transferred to Miami, where he pleaded guilty to making false statements to federal agents and served a few months more in prison. Finally, on March 7, 2000, he was deported to Lebanon.44

  The connection between US-based Hezbollah figures and activity in the tri-border area remained on the US radar over the next several years. In 2007, for example, agents from the Miami JTTF learned of a serious breach of US sanctions related to Hezbollah. During the investigation, US law enforcement discovered that two Miami businessmen, Khaled T. Safadi and Ulises Talavera, along with Paraguayan businessman Emilio Jacinto Gonzalez-Neira, were exporting Sony-brand electronics through Miami to an electronics distributor in Ciudad del Este. What caught the attention of the JTTF was the location of the Paraguayan business, operated by Samer Mehdi, in the Galeria Page shopping center.45 The 2006 Treasury Department designation of the center proscribed any transactions or financial dealings with US persons or companies.46 Later, Khaled Safadi was revea
led to be the cousin of Marwan Safadi, also known as Marwan Kadi, a Paraguayan national arrested in 1996 for plotting to bomb the US embassy in Asunción. Marwan was later extradited to Canada, where he was convicted on drug trafficking charges.47

  The Miami investigation revealed that between March 2007 and January 2008, the defendants knowingly engaged in export violations by doing business with Galeria Page even after it was designated. To conceal the shipments, they filed Shipper’s Export Declarations with false ultimate consignees and marked invoices with fake addresses. Wire transfer payments between Mehdi and the US-based Sony distributors were also routed in such a way as to mask their origins.48 Over a period of about a week in 2007, three separate shipments netted nearly $400,000 in profits for those involved.49

  On February 18, 2010, Safadi, Talavera, and Gonzalez-Neira were arrested by US law enforcement and indicted the next day. Though Samer Mehdi was also indicted, he remains a fugitive from justice.50 After prosecutors agreed to drop charges relating to the Treasury ban on dealings with Galeria Page, Safadi pleaded guilty to lesser charges of conspiring to violate US export law. On January 21, 2011, he was sentenced to six months’ home confinement along with six months’ probation.51

  Even as American intelligence and law enforcement agents ran informants who collected information on Hezbollah in places like South America, Hezbollah did the same in reverse. Once, agents from the FBI’s New York office arrived in the tri-border area to quietly investigate Hezbollah activities. The trip was not made public, and even the host country was only informed of the visit just prior to the agents’ landing. Yet as the agents were walking across the tarmac, only minutes after landing, their pagers went off with instructions to call home. Imagine their shock when they were informed by officers at the New York field office that photographs of the agents coming off the plane had just arrived on the FBI fax machine in New York. The pictures included no text but the message was clear: We knew you were coming, we know you are here. You may be watching us, but we are watching you, too.52