Hezbollah Page 13

  Already concerned about Darabi’s activities in their country, German officials attempted to deport him in June 1992. However, the Iranian government intervened and asked Germany to allow Darabi to remain in the country.123 The second gunman, Abbas Rhayel, and one of the co-conspirators, Youssef Amin, “were members of Hezbollah,” according to Argentine prosecutors, adding they received training at an IRGC center near Rasht in Iran.124 According to German prosecutors, when the “Hit Team” arrived in Berlin and command was transferred from Darabi to Banihashemi, two of the co-conspirators who were not members of Hezbollah “were shut out of the immediate involvement in the act.”125

  The operational stage of the Mykonos attack began on the morning of September 16, when Rhayel and Farajollah Haider, another Hezbollah member of Lebanese origin, received an Uzi machine gun, a pistol, and two silencers. The source of these arms was never identified but was suspected to be linked to Iranian intelligence. German investigators later traced both the pistol and silencer to Iran. On the next morning, September 17, Rhayel and Haider purchased the bags they would use to conceal the weapons as they entered the Mykonos Restaurant.126

  On the night of September 17, Banihashemi and Rhayel entered the restaurant at 10:50 PM, while Amin waited outside to block the door. Haider and an Iranian known only as Mohammad, who had previously been tasked with keeping the targets under surveillance, waited several blocks away with the getaway car. The car had been purchased several days earlier by Ali Dakhil Sabra, who had served with Amin and Rhayel in Lebanon and then come with them to Germany. When the targets emerged into view, Banihashemi shouted, “You sons of whores” in Persian and opened fire. Rhayel followed Banihashemi inside and shot both Sharafkandi and Homayoun Ardalan, the PDKI’s representative in Germany. Between the two assassins, thirty shots were fired. The assailants then fled on foot to the getaway vehicle.127

  The police investigation quickly revealed Iranian involvement in the attack. On September 22, the bag containing the weapons and silencers was discovered, and tests revealed significant similarities between these weapons and those used in the assassination of Iranian dissidents Akbar Mohammadi in Hamburg in 1987 and Bahman Javadi in Cyprus in 1989. The police also matched the serial number on the pistol used by Rhayel to a shipment delivered by a Spanish dealer to the Iranian military in 1972. Rhayel’s palm print was discovered on one of the pistol magazines, the blood of one of the victims was identified on the pistol itself, and Amin’s fingerprints were found on a plastic shopping bag inside the getaway vehicle.128

  According to German prosecutors, Abdolraham Banihashemi “left the city by airplane after the crime and went via Turkey to Iran. There, he was rewarded for his role in the attack with a Mercedes 230 and participation in profitable business transactions.”129 The others were not so fortunate. Darabi and Rhayel were sentenced to life in prison in Germany in April 1997, while Amin and Mohammad Atris, a document forger who assisted the attackers, were given terms of eleven and about five years, respectively.130 While Amin and Atris served out their shorter terms, in December 2007 Darabi and Rhayel were released from prison and returned to Iran. Germany’s Der Spiegel suggested they were released in exchange for a German tourist arrested in Iran in November 2005. Germany, it appears, was not the only country seeking collateral for Darabi and Rhayel’s release; Israel had hoped to bargain for an early release in return for information about Ron Arad, an Israeli aviator shot down over Lebanon in 1986.131

  The brazen assassination in public of four Iranian dissidents at Mykonos, in the opinion of Germany’s highest criminal court, signaled culpability for terrorism at the highest levels of the Islamic Republic. The court judgment rejected the premise that the attack was executed by “mavericks,” concluding that “the assassination [was] put into action much more through the powers in Iran.” By identifying President Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader himself as the orchestrators of the assassination, the judgment found that “Iranian powers not only allow terrorist attacks abroad … but that they themselves set in action such attacks.” When the Tehran regime encountered political opposition, the court determined, its solution was simply to have the opponents “liquidated.”132

  Yet the ruling would not translate into durable and tangible action against Iran or Hezbollah. Iran responded to the placement of a plaque memorializing the victims of the Mykonos attack by displaying one of its own near the German embassy in Tehran denouncing Germany for arming Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Apparently concerned over the diplomatic ramifications, the German ambassador to Iran distanced his government from the original plaque’s assertion of Iranian responsibility for the Mykonos attack.133 While many European nations withdrew their ambassadors from Iran following the ruling, this diplomatic freeze lasted only months. And along with the release of perpetrators Darabi and Rhayel, none of the Iranian leaders identified in the court judgment—Rafsanjani, Fallahian, Velayati, or Khamenei—were ever held to account for their roles in the attack.

  Hezbollah’s emergence as a terrorist force operating in Europe, well beyond the confines of the Middle East, elicited neither a unified nor a coherent strategy by European capitals. Hezbollah was undeterred, and its European operations marked only the beginning of its rapid transformation from a regional threat into a global terrorist network. The European Union would repeatedly refrain from designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, in whole or in part. The consequence would be felt not only in Europe but around the world.

  Notes

  1. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 67.

  2. Ron Eschmann, “Terror on Flight 847,” The Officer 79, no. 7 (October 2003): 23; Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 67–68.

  3. Eschmann, “Terror on Flight 847”; Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 69–71.

  4. Eschmann, “Terror on Flight 847.”

  5. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 70–71; Associated Press, “Slain Navy Man Bravely Endured Beatings, TWA Attendant Says,” September 20, 1988; Jennifer Bayot, “Uli Derickson, 60, Flight Attendant Who Helped Airline Hostages, Dies,” New York Times, February 24, 2005.

  6. Richard L. Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Plaintiff’s Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Case No. 00-CV-00159, United States District Court, District of Columbia, December 31, 2001.

  7. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 71–72; Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.; Associated Press, “Slain Navy Man Bravely Endured Beatings, TWA Attendant Says,” September 20, 1988.

  8. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 74.

  9. Jennifer Bayot, “Uli Derickson, 60, Flight Attendant Who Helped Airline Hostages, Dies,” New York Times, February 24, 2005; Jon Thurber, “Uli Derickson, 60; Was Lead Flight Attendant on Hijacked Jet,” Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2005.

  10. US CIA, “Terrorist Use of Beirut International Airport.”

  11. US CIA, “Terrorist Use of Beirut International Airport”; William E. Smith, “Terror Aboard Flight 847,” Time, June 24, 2001.

  12. US CIA, “Two Jordanian Jets Hijacked”; Smith, “Terror aboard Flight 847.”

  13. US CIA, “Terrorist Use of Beirut International Airport”; US CIA, “Two Jordanian Jets Hijacked”; Smith, “Terror Aboard Flight 847.”

  14. US CIA, “Terrorist Use of Beirut International Airport.”

  15. Ibid.

  16. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 74–75.

  17. Ibid., 75–77; Smith, “Terror Aboard Flight 847.”

  18. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 77; Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.

  19. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 77–78.

  20. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 95; Ariel Merari et al., “Review of International Terrorism in 1985,” Project on Terrorism, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Jerusalem Post, 1986, 89.

  21. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 78–79.

  22. Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.; Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 78–7
9.

  23. Eschmann, “Terror on Flight 847.”

  24. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 79–81.

  25. Ibid., 78.

  26. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, Washington, DC, October 1986, 2.

  27. Ibid., 11–14.

  28. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 83–85; Smith, “Terror Aboard Flight 847.”

  29. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 85–87; Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.

  30. Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.

  31. In his memoir, Captain Testrake recalls just a single shot, not two. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 85; Eschmann, “Terror on Flight 847”; Smith, “Terror Aboard Flight 847.”

  32. Clarridge, Spy for all Seasons, 350; Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 86–87.

  33. James Risen, “U.S. Traces Iran’s Ties to Terror through a Lebanese,” New York Times, January 17, 2002.

  34. Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.

  35. Eschmann, “Terror on Flight 847.”

  36. US CIA, “Status of TWA Hijacking/Hostages.”

  37. Isabel Kershner, “The Changing Colors of Imad Mughniyah,” Jerusalem Report, March 25, 2002; United States of America v. Ali Atwa et al., United States District Court, District of Columbia, No. 85-0405, November 14, 1985; Shaked and Rabinovich, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 87.

  38. USA v. Ali Atwa et al.

  39. US FBI Special Agent [name redacted] affidavit, “In Re: Hizballah, aka Islamic Jihad Organization,” June 8, 1997.

  40. Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.

  41. Reuters, “Captors ‘Nice People’ Greek Folk Singer Says,” June 19, 1985; Smith, “Terror Aboard Flight 847”; Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 88.

  42. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 88.

  43. Stethem et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al.

  44. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 88–89; USA v. Ali Atwa et al.

  45. Testrake, Triumph over Terror, 90–91.

  46. Ibid., 98.

  47. “Chronology of Hostage Crisis,” Washington Post, June 30, 1985.

  48. Clarridge, Spy for all Seasons, 339; “Victoria Toensing: FISA Fears Shielded 9/11 Plotters,” Newsmax.com, January 24, 2006.

  49. USA v. Ali Atwa et al.

  50. Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Links Hijacker on Kuwaiti Plane 1985 Air Piracy,” New York Times, April 16, 1988; James M. Markham, “Brother of Suspected Hijacker Arrested,” New York Times, January 28, 1987.

  51. United Press International, “Seven Lebanese Questioned in Embassy Bombing Plot,” November 29, 1984; Janet Stobart, “Italians Foil Possible Terrorist Attack on US Embassy in Rome,” Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1984.

  52. United Press International, “Seven Lebanese Questioned in Embassy Bombing Plot”; Stobart, “Italians Foil Possible Terrorist Attack on US Embassy in Rome.”

  53. Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 16; Stobart, “Italians Foil Possible Terrorist Attack,” November 29, 1984; “Callers Warn Italy on Plot Probe,” Washington Post, November 29, 1984; “Italy: Disaster Averted,” Time, December 10, 1984.

  54. Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 20; Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 93.

  55. “Islamic Jihad Admits to Blast in Spain,” Globe and Mail, April 15, 1985; US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, 11.

  56. Edward Cody, “Anti-Terror Efforts Revive Interest in an Old Enemy—FBI List Includes Lebanese Suspect in Past Attacks on U.S.,” Washington Post, October 31, 2001.

  57. Government of New Zealand, “Case to Designate Lebanese Hizbollah’s Military Wing”; Times Wire Services, “3 Copenhagen Blasts Injure 22: Vengeance for Lebanon, Islamic Jihad Declares,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1985.

  58. France v. Saleh Fouad Ben Ali, Cour d’Appel de Paris, 1ère Chambre d’Accusation, March 4, 1991.

  59. Diana Geddes, “Panic over Paris Store Bombs,” Times (London), December 9, 1985.

  60. Scheherezade Faramarzi, “Mughniyeh Was a Key Hezbollah Commander, Insider Says,” Associated Press, February 27, 2008.

  61. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986, Washington, DC, 38.

  62. France v. Saleh Fouad Ben Ali; Associated Press, “Terrorist Mastermind Sentenced to Life for Paris Bombings,” April 14, 1992.

  63. Agence France Presse, “Pro-Iranian Terrorists Sentenced Over Paris Bomb Attacks,” April 14, 1992.

  64. Translated from France v. Saleh Fouad Ben Ali.

  65. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Trial of Accused Mastermind in Bombings Begins in Paris,” New York Times, January 30, 1990; Didier Bigo, “Les attentats de 1986 en France: Un cas de violence transnationale et ses implications,” Cultures & Conflicts 4 (Winter 1991): 5.

  66. Ibid.

  67. William Echikson, “How France Links Iran to Terror,” Christian Science Monitor, July 31, 1987.

  68. Brian Moynahan, “French in Crisis Talks as Embassy Deadline Nears,” Sunday Times (London), July 26, 1987.

  69. Moynahan, “French in Crisis”; Richard Bernstein, “French Report on Terrorism Raises Suspicions about Iran,” New York Times, July 24, 1987; Bigo, “Les attentats de 1986 en France.”

  70. Ibrahim, “Trial of Accused Mastermind.”

  71. “Tunisian Given Life Sentence in Series of Paris Bombings,” New York Times, April 15, 1992.

  72. Ibrahim, “Trial of Accused Mastermind.”

  73. Buenos Aires, Argentina Judicial Branch, AMIA Indictment, Office of the National Federal Court No. 17, Criminal and Correctional Matters No. 9, Case No. 1156, March 5, 2003, (hereafter cited as AMIA indictment), 186–87.

  74. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 97.

  75. Ibid., 155.

  76. Bigo, “Les attentats de 1986 en France,” 5.

  77. US CIA, “Iranian Support for Terrorism in 1987,” 13.

  78. Paul Lewis, “France Breaks Iran Ties and Isolates Embassy,” New York Times, July 18, 1987; Ariel Merari et al., “Review of International Terrorism in 1987,” JCSS Project on Low Intensity Warfare, Jerusalem Post, 1986, 52; Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 123.

  79. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 97; Federal Court of Canada, Mohamed Hussein Al Husseini, Annex E. October 23, 1993, 9.

  80. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 124; Shay, Axis of Evil, 176.

  81. US CIA, “Lebanon: Prospects for Islamic Fundamentalism.”

  82. US CIA, “Prospects for Hizballah Terrorism in Africa.”

  83. Ihsan Hijazi, “Kidnapping Suspect Helps Syria,” New York Times, June 1, 1988.

  84. Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 28.

  85. Marc Fisher, “Bonn Condemns Threat by Shiites,” Washington Post, July 26, 1991; Martin Kramer, “Will Germany Release an American-Killer?” Sandstorm, January 27, 2004.

  86. US Senator John Kerry and US Senator Hank Brown, “The BCCI Affair,” A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., December 1992, 445.

  87. Bergman, Secret War with Iran, 191; Statement of Matthew Levitt, Islamic Extremism in Europe: Beyond al-Qaeda—Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe.

  88. Munich, German Judicial Branch, Judgment of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Munich Landgericht I, Gz. 1 KLs 112 Js 3948/89, December 22, 1989, 4–5.

  89. Diaz and Newman, Lightning Out of Lebanon, 102–3; United States of America v. Bassam Gharib Makki, Presentence Investigation Report, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, CR 98-334-01, February 12, 1999, p. 7.

  90. Munich, German Judicial Branch, Judgment of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Munich Landgericht I, Gz. 1 KLs 112 Js 3948/89, December 22, 1989, 5–10.

  91. “West Germans Arrest Suspect in Bomb Plot,” Anchorage Daily News, July 7, 1989.

  92. Munich, German Judicial Branch, Judgment of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Munich Landgericht I, Gz. 1 KLs 112 Js 3948/89, December 22, 1989, 8–10.

&nb
sp; 93. Ibid., 12–14.

  94. USA v. Bassam Gharib Makki.

  95. Munich, German Judicial Branch, Judgment of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Munich Landgericht I, Gz. 1 KLs 112 Js 3948/89, December 22, 1989, 22; USA v. Bassam Gharib Makki.

  96. US CIA, “Iranian Support for Terrorism in 1987,” 13.

  97. Thomas Sanction et al., “The Tehran Connection,” Time, March 21, 1994.

  98. John Vinocur, “Exiled Iranian General Is Killed with Brother by Gunmen in Paris,” New York Times, February 8, 1984.

  99. Vinocur, “Exiled Iranian General Is Killed”; “Murder of Iranian Exile Underlines Risk of Paris,” Globe and Mail, February 9, 1984.

  100. Michael Horsnell and Hazhir Teimourian, “Two Iranians Shot Dead in London,” Times (London), October 3, 1987.

  101. Hazhir Teimourian and Nicholas Beeston, “Iranian Extremist Cell in UK Could Number under 12,” Times (London), March 3, 1989.

  102. Argentina, Buenos Aires, Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General. Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA Case. Report by Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nisman, October 25, 2006 (hereafter cited as Burgos and Nisman), 25.

  103. Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, “No Safe Haven: Iran’s Global Assassination Campaign,” May 2008, 26.

  104. Anthony Loyd, “Tomb of the Unknown Assassin Reveals Mission to Kill Rushdie,” Times (London), June 8, 2005.

  105. Chehabi and Abisaab, Distant Relations, 292–93.

  106. US CIA, “Iran: Enhanced Terrorist Capabilities.”

  107. Loyd, “Tomb of the Unknown Assassin.”

  108. Burgos and Nisman, 24–25; Sanction et al., “Tehran Connection.”

  109. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, Washington, DC, April 1991, 15.

  110. Sanction et al., “Tehran Connection.”